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COMMENTARY 
A Republican-Liberal's Perspective 
Those ~ho think of themsel.ves as republican or civi_c :i~er~ls, as I do, will surely be of two minds about Sey la Benhab1b s 'Disman-
tling the Leviathan: Citizen and State in a Global World" [Spring 
2001 ]. In some respects, Professor Benhabib' s thoughtful essay is quite 
congenial to republican liberalism. She insists on the importance of 
human rights, for instance, and she looks for ways to expand political 
participation. Her indictment of "civic republicanism," however, 
requires a republican-liberal response. 
There are three problems with Benhabib's argument, the first 
being that het criticism of civic republicanism is misdirected. Her 
target is "civic republicans like Michael Walzer," who "conflate the 
boundaries of the ethical community, which is inherently culture-
bound, with those of the democratic polity, which is not culture-bound in 
the same manner and to the same degree" (her emphasis). If this statement 
accurately reflects Walzer' s views, then he was surely right to protest, 
in his response to Benhabib's essay, that he is no civic republican. 
From Aristotle and Cicero to Hannah Arendt and Michael Sandel, 
republicans have sought to promote the civic virtues of the public-
spirited citizen. They believe that the members of the res publica ought 
to be self-governing participants in public affairs, and, following 
Cicero, their conception of "public" is of a group of people united 
under law. Hence the old definition of a republic as "an empire of 
laws, not of men." In principle, then, republicans have no reason to 
insist that citizens must share ties of blood, ethnicity, or culture, and 
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they can be quite happy with the "constitutional patriotism" that 
Habermas ha.s endorsed and Benhabib apparently accepts. 
There is a difference, though, between principle and practice. This 
difference points to the second problem with Benhabib's criticism of 
civic republicanism. Republicans acknowledge that civic virtues re-
quire cultivation and reinforcement. If the members of a polity are to 
take the part of public-spirited citizens, there must be some sense in 
which they understand themselves as part of a public-that is, as 
people engaged in a common, if not all-embracing, enterprise. Cul-
tural considerations surely play a part here-through a common 
language, civic education, and shared traditions-as they foster feel-
ings of attachment and solidarity. Civic republicans will join Benhabib 
by resisting, in principle, the conflation of cultural with political 
integration, but they will think that it is neither easy nor prudent, in 
practice, to draw a sharp distinction between culture and politics. 
Political integration is primary, however, and cultural considerations 
are important to the republican only insofar as they promote the sense 
that one is part of a public. 
The third problem concerns Benhabib' s policy recommendations, 
which call for "porous borders" and limited voting rights for nonciti-
zens. Her reasons for extending" democratic participation rights ... at 
the local and regional state levels" to noncitizens are neither clear nor 
compelling. Her point, presumably, is that noncitizens have a stake in 
decisions made at these levels, so they should have a say in them. But 
they will also have a stake-and possibly a greater one-in decisions 
made at higher levels. Why, then, should noncitizens not have a vote 
at the national or state level? The answer, I suppose, is that decisions 
at the upper levels are too important; voting in local and regional 
elections is a low-risk way in which nondtizens may try their civic 
wings before becoming full-fledged citizens. That answer, however, 
runs counter to the presumption that people should have a vote 
whenever they have a stake in the outcome. It also betrays a failure to 
appreciate the im~ortance of local or regional decisions, which are 
sometimes more salient to the people they affect, as the "Nimby" 
syndrome attests, than national-level decisions. 
I also worry that Benhabib's recommendations may be self-de-
feating. That is, their effect may well be to dilute and discourage 
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citizenship, and thus run counter to Benhabib's aim of "making 
erstwhile strangers and foreigners into partners in a community of 
democratic interpretation and articulation" (her emphasis). Benhabib 
will agree, I think, that citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal 
dimension-that one may be a citizen, in the legal sense, without 
being a "good" or "real" or "true" citizen. That much seems implied 
by her desire to help foreigners become "partners in a community." 
When she writes, however, of "political globalization," "transnational 
political membership," and voting rights for people who may be 
"unwilling ... to change their citizenship of origin," she hints at a kind 
of free-floating, cosmopolitan citizenship that is unlikely to encourage 
the public-spirited attitude one expects of partners in a community. 
Despite her cautious statements about the need for "minimum resi-
dency, language, employment, and family status requirements," the 
picture emerges of a world in which political exit and entrance are so 
easy that citizens, in the legal sense, will have little reason to exercise 
voice within or demonstrate loyalty to their supposed communities. 
That is why republican liberals must hesitate, at least, to endorse 
Professor Benhabib's recommendations. Yet they are closer to her 
position, in their republicanism as much as in their liberalism, than 
she recognizes. Republican liberals do not want to see people con-
signed to "permanent alienage" or denied the opportunity to become 
partners in a democratic community any more than does Benhabib. 
Whether her transnational means will accomplish this shared civic 
end is the point at issue. 
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